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Liquidated Damages as Prima Facie Evidence
Parties to a contract often agree on the damages to be paid in the
event of breach. These damages are said to be "liquidated" in the con-
tract itself. However, the recovery provided may not equal the actual
loss, the amount which would be recovered under the standard measure
of contract damages. Indeed, a liquidated damages clause may provide
recovery of an amount greater than the actual loss, thereby placing
the plaintiff in a better position than he would have been in had the de-
fendant performed. Under such circumstances, enforcement of the
liquidated damages clause would conflict with the standard measure of
contract damages.'
The standard measure of contract damages implements a policy of
compensation. As Mr. Justice Holmes observed:
The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that
you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else.2
One classic work3 explains that "it is impossible to separate the law
of contract damages from the larger body of motives and policies
which constitutes the general law of contracts."4 It must be remembered
I "[T]he general goal of contract damages is ... to put the plaintiff in as good a posi-
tion as he would have been in had the defendant kept his contract." 11 S. WILISTON, A
TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs 198 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968). See 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN
oN ComTRcrs § 1002 (1964) ; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 (1932); Illinois Cent. R.R.
v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57 (1930); Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243 (1924); Hetzel v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 169 U.S. 26 (1898); Electrical Prods. Consol. v. Sweet, 83 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1936);
King v. Beatrice Foods Co., 89 Idaho 52, 402 P.2d 966 (1965); Wired Music, Inc. v. Clark,
26 IlL App. 2d 413, 168 N.E.2d 736 (1960); Ray v. Eurice, 201 Md. 115, 92 A.2d 272
(1952); Cragin v Jones, 283 Mass. 474, 186 N.E. 578 (1933); Stark v. Magnuson, 212 Minn.
167, 2 N.W.2d 814 (1942); J.B. Preston Co. v. Funkhouser, 261 N.Y. 140, 184 N.E 737
(1933); Maxwell v. Schaefer, 381 Pa. 13, 112 A.2d 69 (1955); McDaniel v. Daves, 139 Va.
178, 123 S.E. 663 (1924); Odgers v. Held, 58 Wash. 2d 247, 362 P.2d 261 (1961).
2 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 H~Av. L. REv. 457, 462 (1896). See also Birming-
ham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry of Contract Law, 1969
DuKE L.J. 49; 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 992 (1964); 11 S. WrILrsToN, A
TRETISE o THE LAw oF CONTRACTS §§ 1338, 1339 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968); Fuller & Per-
due, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); RESTATEMENT Or
CONTRACTS § 329 (1932).
1 Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).4 Id. at 53. Cf. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495,
496-98 (1962).
It is necessary to remember that the grant of state power to a contracting party to en-
force his bargain is not self-justifying. Cf., e.g., Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An
Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 718-22 (1931); Farnsworth, The Past of Promise:
An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUm. L. REv. 576 (1969). Therefore, any
study of contract damages should begin with the premises upon which contract law is
founded.
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that contract law structures exchange relations in the competitive mar-
ket and enforces individual contracts in order to encourage efficient
utilization of resources in this market Therefore, the compensation
for breach should be consistent with the allocation provided by the
competitive market.6 Damages computed under the standard contract
measure effectuate a policy of compensation consistently with the
allocation of the competitive market, but enforcement of a liquidated
damages clause which provides recovery of an amount greater than
the actual loss does not.
Some commentators, however, have suggested that a liquidated
damages clause should be enforced without regard to the actual loss.
Indeed, courts have advanced several arguments for enforcing liqui-
dated damages clauses which award damages greater than the actual
loss! This note will examine the arguments for strict enforcement of
these agreements, together with the underlying assumptions of the
courts in approaching a liquidated damages clause, by applying a model
of the market system. This note will suggest that a liquidated damages
clause should be considered prima facie evidence of damage, enforceable
unless it is proven that actual loss is less. This solution would resolve
ambiguities in the law, give force to the agreement of the parties, and
allow the parties to provide a remedy when proof of actual loss is im-
possible.
TUE MODEL OF PERFECT COMPETITION
In order to facilitate a clear understanding of the impact of liqui-
dated damages on the competitive market's maintenance of the efficient
utilization of resources, a model of a perfectly competitive market will
be used. This model has the following characteristics:
(1) firms produce a homogeneous commodity, and consumers are
identical from the seller's point of view, in that there are no advantages
or disadvantages associated with selling to a particular consumer;
(2) both firms and consumers are numerous, and the sales or purchases
of each individual unit are small in relation to the aggregate volume
of transactions;
Cf. R. POSNER, EcoNomIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 41-44, 55-57 (1973); Llewellyn, What
Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE LJ. 704, 718-22 (1931); Birmingham,
Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 R-UTGERs L. Rlv. 273
(1970).
6 See generally Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Effi-
ciency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970).
7 See text accompanying note 19 infra.
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(3) both firms and consumers possess perfect information about the
prevailing price and current bids, and they take advantage of every
opportunity to increase profits and utility respectively;
(4) entry and exit from the market is free for both firms and con-
sumers.
8
To the extent that the law approximates this model, there will be
efficient utilization of resources9 and the market will be in equilibrim.'0
When an economic inefficiency occurs, the market is in disequilibrium, in
the face of which the perfectly competitive market corrects itself.
The ability of a producer or consumer to enter or leave a market
is an important corrective for market disequilibrim. For instance, where
there is an oversupply, market mobility permits firms to transfer their
productive capacity to another market"1 easing the oversupply and re-
storing equilibrim. If the competitive market is to allocate resources
efficiently, market mobility must not be discouraged. In order to en-
courage efficient exchange relations in the competitive market, the
law must respond to a breach of contract in a manner which will allow
market mobility.
When the amount provided in a liquidated damages clause exceeds
actual loss, enforcement of the liquidated damages clause imposes a price
for breach which is higher than the cost of compensating the innocent
party, thus deterring breach of inefficient contracts and denying mobility
in the market. Clearly, when a party breaches a contract which has be-
come unprofitable, overcompensation such as this is not the proper
remedy. 2
To penalize [market] adjustments through overcompensation of the
innocent party is to discourage efficient reallocation of community
8 j. HENDERSON & R. QuANDT, MIcRoECoNO IC THEORY 86 (1958).
9 Since this model excludes many variables, it will not permit analysis of every trans-
action. However, it may provide a basis for a consistent theory of contract damages. Cf. F.
KviGET, Risx, UNCERTAINTY AND PRoFrI 76 (1921):
In order to study first the most essential features of exchange relations, it will
be necessary to simplify the situation as far as possible by a process of "heroic"
abstraction.
10 When there is efficient utilization of resources, the market is said to be in equilib-
rium: the quantities of goods produced are equal to the quantities of goods demanded. No
goods are produced which are not "needed." See C. FERGUSON, MICROECONOAUC T EORY
210-12 (1966); C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, ECONO31Ic A-ALYSiS 175-79 (1970); A.
ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: THrEORY IN USE 85-87, 357 (1969).
11 A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: THEORY IN USE 359-60
(1969).
12 Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiaency, 24
RUTGERS L. REv. 273, 284 (1970). Professor Birmingham points out that fear that the
plaintiff will be undercompensated does not justify punishment of the party who has
breached the contract. Rather, the general rule of recovery must be more efficiently imple-
mented. For example, the breaching party should bear the transaction costs of his breach
as part of the price for breach. Id. at 285.
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resources. . . Rigidity resulting from thus binding a party to his
undertaking limits the factor and product mobility essential to proper
functioning of the market mechanism."
Instead, the competitive market requires that no higher price for breach
be imposed than the cost of compensating the victim." Where contracts
have become unproductive, breach of contract should be encouraged by
awarding only compensation, because compensation properly reallocates
resources. With this analytical framework in mind, the arguments for
strict enforcement of liquidated damages will be discussed.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AS AN EXCEPTION TO COMPENSATION
Three arguments have been advanced for treating liquidated dam-
ages as an exception to the ordinary policy of compensation. First, it
has been argued that if it was the parties' "intent" to make a reason-
able estimate of possible future damages, then that estimate should
be binding on the court without regard to actual loss'5 Second, it has
13/d. at 284-85. Professor Birmingham illustrates this by drawing upon the common
law labor contract. When the employer breached such an agreement, the employee was
under a duty to mitigate his losses by finding other employment. This served economic
efficiency because:
If the value of a worker hired at a salary of $10,000 falls to $8000, an employer
will gain through repudiation of their agreement when the resulting cost to him
is less than $2000. If transaction costs are disregarded, breach will thus be profit-
able to the employer if and only if the worker can obtain another job paying more
than $8000. A new employer will not normally pay the worker more than what
he anticipates his services will contribute to the undertaking. The rule therefore
encourages breach where the product of the worker would be greater in an alterna-
tive position and discourages breach where the product would be less.
Id. at 291.
The common law attitude is reflected in the general rule that punitive damages may
not be recovered for breach of contract. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrs § 342 (1932);
5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTs § 1077 (1964); Peitzman v. City of llmo, 141 F.2d 956
(8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 718 (1944), reh. denied, 323 U.S. 813 (1044); Con-
tractors' Safety Ass'n v. California Compensation Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 71, 307 P.2d 626
(1957); Murphy Auto Sales, Inc. v. Coomer, 123 Ind. App. 709, 112 N.E.2d 589 (1953);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Outerbridge, 42 Misc. 2d 756, 249 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1963)
Davis v. Tunison, 168 Ohio St. 471, 155 N.E.2d 904 (1959); Wright v. Everett, 197 Va.
608, 90 S.E.2d 855 (1956).
Punitive damages may, of course, be authorized by statute. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Victory
Container Corp., 294 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mahon v. Berg, 267 Cal. App. 2d 588,
73 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1968); Kilgore v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 110 Ga. App. 280,
138 S.E.2d 397 (1964); Smith v. Piper, 423 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
14 Cf. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1896):
Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than
in the law of contract .... If you commit a tort you are liable to pay a compen-
satory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum
unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference. But such
a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it ad-
vantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can.
Holmes would also guarantee every man's right "to break his contract if he chooses .
O.W. HoiT s, THE ComoN LAW 236 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
'5 See note 19 infra & text accompanying.
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been urged that liquidated damages should be enforceable as a bet..'
Finally, commentators have suggested that the strict enforcement of
a liquidated damages clause would promote judicial economy and effi-
ciency by displacing time-consuming litigation."
Liquidated Damages and the "Intention" of the Parties
Generally, courts will not automatically enforce a liquidated dam-
ages clause.' 8 However, some courts have indicated that if it was a rea-
sonable estimate of the damages they would award the liquidated dam-
ages without regard to actual loss.' 9 Similarly, other courts have said
that if the amount of damages was uncertain at the time of contract,
'
6 See notes 26 & 27 infra & text accompanying.
17 See note 32 infra & text accompanying.
18 Cf. Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1947); Annot., 6
A.L.R.2d 1401 (1949); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 594 (1942).
Professor Williston records that the early form of contractual obligation was a bond
upon condition, a security device to compel performance. The bond itself was a promise
to pay a sum certain unless the condition was performed. Certainly by the time of the
Restoration, equity granted relief against certain of these bonds. Equity would relieve
against "penalty" bonds, but not against those where no value could be placed upon breach.
That distinction has developed into the present distinction between penalties and liquidated
damages. 5 S. WiLmsToN, A TREATISE ON E LAw Or CoNRAcTs §§ 774-75A (3d ed. W.
Jaeger 1968).
The courts are also authorized to strike down liquidated damages clauses by both the
UNIIRoM COMAMRCIAL CODE and the REsTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS.
UNIFORM Comm:ERciAL CODE § 2-718(1) :
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated but only at an amount
which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the
breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of
otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liqui-
dated damages is void as a penalty.
RESTATE3ENT OF CONTRACTS §339(1) (1932):
An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the damages therefor, is
not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the damages recoverable for the
breach, unless:
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for
the harm that is caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very diffi-
cult of accurate estimation.
'
9 See, e.g., Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907); United States v. LeRoy Dyal Co,
186 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1950); Ely v. Wickham, 158 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1946); Frick
Co. v. Rubel Corp., 62 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1933); Stephens v. Essex County Park Comm'n,
143 F. 844 (3d Cir. 1906); Wood v. Niagara Falls Paper Co., 121 F. 818 (2d Cir. 1903);
in re Lion Overall Co., 55 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd sub norn. United States
v. Walkof, 144 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1944); Byron Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp.
665 (S.D. Cal. 1940); Bailey v. Manufacturers' Lumber Co, 224 F. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1915);
Robbins v. Plant, 174 Ark. 639, 297 S.W. 1027 (1927); Blackwood v. Liebke, 87 Ark. 545,
113 S.W. 210 (1908); Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., 89 Conn. 51, 92 A. 665 (1914);
Parker-Washington Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill. 136, 107 N.E. 872 (1915); Downtown
Harvard Lunch Club v. Racso, Inc., 201 Misc. 1087, 107 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 1951);
Learned v. Holbrook, 87 Ore. 576, 170 P. 530, reh. denied, 87 Ore. 589, 3.71 P. 222 (1918);
Kelso v. Reid, 145 Pa. 606, 23 A. 323 (1892); Mead v. Anton, 33 Wash. 2d 741, 207 P.2d
227 (1949).
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although capable of proof at the time of trial, the liquidated damages
clause would still be enforceable.2 In effect, these courts would bind
the parties to their original agreement if their "intention" at the time
of contract was to make a reasonable, present estimate of a possible,
future loss."
This position assumes that the parties, at the time of contract,
fashioned a remedy consistent with the market allocation. If the remedy
is in fact consistent, the liquidated amount will equal the actual loss and
enforcement would provide compensation. However, the position of the
parties relative to the market may have changed by the time breach
occurs. Hence, the amount of actual loss may be less than the amount
computed under the liquidated damages clause. Precisely because mar-
ket position has changed, it may be desirable to encourage breach in
order that the market may regain equilibrim.22 If the law is unable to
rectify deviation from the efficient allocation of resources, it perpetuates
inefficiency.2" In order that the market may restore equilibrim, only
compensation for actual loss should be awarded by the court, whatever
may have been the intention of the parties.
I
Liquidated Damages as a Bet
One commentator has argued that a liquidated damages clause
should be treated as a secondary promise to pay money, enforceable in
its own right independently of any losses caused by breach of the
"primary" promises in a contract. 4 Damages for breach of the promise
2 0 See, e.g., Gustav Hirsch Org. v. Eastern Ky. Rural Elec. Co-op Corp., 201 F. Supp.
809 (E.D. Ky. 1962); Associated Press v. Emmett, 45 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Cal. 1942); Rob-
bins v. Plant, 174 Ark. 639, 297 S.W. 1027 (1927); Downtown Harvard Lunch Club v.
Racso, Inc., 201 Misc. 1087, 107 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Callanan Road Imp. Co. v.
Colonial Sand & Stone Co, 190 Misc. 418, 72 N.V.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Miller v. Block-
berger, 111 Ohio St. 798, 146 N.E. 206 (1924); Knapp v. Ottinger, 206 Okla. 113, 240
P.2d 1083 (1951).
21 To a great extent, cases which have announced this position seem to have overstated
the issue before them. The determination of whether the estimate made by the parties
was "reasonable" often turns upon evidence bearing upon the extent of actual loss. See
note 55 infra & text accompanying.
22 Cf. text accompanying note 14 supra.
Cf. Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry of
Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49; Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal Cases:
Excuse for Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic Theory,
20 HASTINGS L. REV. 1393 (1969).
11 Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEo. STUn.
277, 283-87 (1972). Professor Barton relies upon Birmingham, Broach of Contract, Dam-
age Measures and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. Rzv. 273 (1970). However, Pro-
fessor Birmingham's work demonstrates that the common law rules of contract damages
serve economic efficiency by preventing overcompensation. Id. at 284 et seq. This note
argues that under Professor Birmingham's analysis, economic efficiency would not be
served if liquidated damages were strictly enforced. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
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to pay the liquidated amount would, of course, be equal to the liquidated
amount.2" Such a promise, it is said, should be enforceable as a bet. 6
The most obvious objection to such an approach is doctrinal: that a
bet is void as against public policy and unenforceable at common law.27
Yet even assuming no public policy against bets, a bet in the form of a
liquidated damages clause would still face serious objections to its en-
forcement.
A liquidated damages clause which provides for a recovery greater
than the actual loss would operate to penalize a breach of the primary
promises in the contract. Such a penalty discourages market mobility
and is economically inefficient, 8 and is thus inconsistent with the opera-
tion of a competitive market which the policies underlying contract law
facilitate.2 9 Therefore, even if bets were generally enforceable, ° a bet
of this sort should not be.
25 If found to be enforceable, a liquidated damages clause is simply an agreement to
pay a sum of money. For breach of such an agreement, the victim may usually recover
the face amount with legal interest thereon. 5 A. CoRBNn, CoRBn ON CoNrmcrs § 1078
(1964).
26 Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEO. SiTM. 277,
283-87 (1972). Professor Barton limits the application of this rule to cases where the
contract negotiations were "fair." By "fair," he means negotiations between parties "with
a rather complete knowledge of each other's utilities." Id. at 282-83. His analysis thereby
excludes any problems raised by bargaining that is oppressive due to a lack of informa-
tion. This note will also exclude analysis of adhesion or unconscionability and will
assume fair bargaining. The solution proposed in this note is made expressly inapplicable
where the bargain is unfair. See note 39 infra.7See 7 A. CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACrS § 1484 (1964). Where a liquidated damages
clause exceeds actual loss, more than simply the risk of breach has been allocated. In fact,
a new risk has been created: the risk that one party must pay an amount in excess of com-
pensation for breach of the primary promise in the contract. The creation of such a risk
is the creation of a bet. Id.
In order to avoid the imputation of a bet, it might be argued that a liquidated dam-
ages clause is insurance. The analogy in insurance would perhaps be the "valued policy"
in which the parties make a pre-estimate of the value of the thing insured. In the absence
of fraud, such a policy is generally enforceable. See W.R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF INSuRANCE § 157 (1951). However, where loss is not total, the face amount of a valued
policy is not recoverable. Rather, only the amount of actual loss may be recovered. J.A.
APPLEM A & J. APPLEmlA, INsURANcE LAw AND PRACTICE § 3861 (1972). Accordingly, if
liquidated damages are analogized to valued policies, they could not be awarded in their
face amount were it shown that plaintiff did not suffer the full extent of the damages
anticipated and provided for in the liquidated damages clause. Any recovery beyond actual
loss would be the payment of insurance where there was no insurable interest. See 7 A.
COBINe, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTs §§ 1481-82 (1964).
Professor Barton, apparently conceding that liquidated damages clauses are not in-
surance, calls for their enforcement as bets. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for
Breach of Contract, I J. LE. STUD. 277, 287 (1972).
28 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
29 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
3 0 The enforcement of a bet represents merely a wealth transfer, and economic policy
would be indifferent to a choice between enforcement and non-enforcement since it would
be impossible to determine which of two individuals, as individuals, would derive greater
benefit from the goods in question. See J. HENDERSON & R. QuANDT, McoscoNomc
1975]
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Ironically, although the suggestion that liquidated damage clauses
should be enforced as a bet is offered as a means of encourging parties
to allocate the risks of breach through this device, strict enforcement
of such clauses would deter their use for this purpose. Presumably,
when parties bargain over a liquidated damages clause, they discount
the value of the agreement by the risk that it will be unenforceable.
This discount is reflected in the lower "premium" which must be paid in
order to obtain a liquidated damage clause. However, if these agree-
ments were strictly enforced, they would be more valuable and the
premium necessary to obtain one would increase. This higher premium
would discourage the purchase of such agreements, even in those situa-
tions where they are efficient, for example, when it would be desirable
to allocate damages which could be peculiarly difficult of proof. Since
strict enforcement would deter liquidated damages even when they serve
economic efficiency, such a policy is conterproductive.3
Judicial Economy
Finally, the argument has been made that considerations of judicial
economy justify the enforcement of all liquidated damage clauses. 2
Clearly, such strict enforcement would eliminate costly litigation by
making proof of damages unnecessary. An absolute rule of this kind
would also encourage settlements since the outcome of litigation could
be easily predicted. However, this rule would create serious inefficiencies
in the market to the extent that the price of breach exceeded the cost of
compensating the victim.3
From the preceding analysis, it is apparent that strictly enforcing
all liquidated damage clauses, thereby treating them as exceptions to
TEoRY 255 (2d ed. 1971). However, if a particular bet is shown to restrict market mo-
bility, its enforcement would be inconsistent with the competitive market. Moreover, there
is no apparent social utility in offering the machinery of enforcement to parties who bet
against the performance of contracts.
31 It might be objected that competitive forces in the market will produce liquidated
damages approximating actual loss, since the price which must be paid for an agree-
ment covering only actual loss will be competitive. This price would be competitive only
if we assume that no parties in the market will attempt to make bets and that all parties
in the market possess perfect foreknowledge of the actual loss. The former assumption
seems unwarranted, however, while the latter assumption is unrealistic. Clearly, con-
tracting parties do not possess this foreknowledge. In fact, it is clear that the parties
will very often bargain to a mistake. See Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal
Cases: Excuse for Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic
Theory, 20 HAsTINGs L. REv. 1393 (1969).
32 Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 Wis. L. REv.
833, 838. Professor McCormick also urged that judicial economy justified a more liberal
policy toward liquidated damages clauses. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES §§ 148-50 (1935); McCormick, Liquidated Damages, 17 VA. L. REV. 103 (1930).
33 Cf. text accompanying notes 12 & 13 supra.
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the ordinary policy of compensation, would produce inefficiencies in the
market." However, this does not mean that liquidated damages can
serve no function in the market. Through an agreement on damages,
a potential paintiff may avoid the practical problems of proving actual
damages, which would reduce the cost of breach and encourage the
formation of contracts. Moreover, by enforcing such agreements in
cases where proof of actual damage might otherwise be lacking, the law
may also effectuate the policy of compensation." Clearly, what is needed
is a rule which would ensure that a liquidated damages clause is en-
forced only when it is consistent with the market allocation.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE
A liquidated damages clause should be treated as prima facie
evidence of damages for breach. 6 When a breach is shown, a presump-
tion should arise in favor of the plaintiff that the amount computed
under the liquidated damages clause is the proper recovery." The de-
fendant would then have the opportunity to rebut this presumption by
proving that the actual loss was less. In an action for breach of contract,
where breach has been shown, but where determining the dimensions of
damage is very difficult, plaintiff will be relieved of the burden of prov-
ing damages and awarded the liquidated amount.38 Yet the over-
4 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
3
-
5 See Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CoRawa. L.Q. 495, 498
(1962).
An individual defendant may in some instances be unable to prove a discrepancy be-
tween actual loss and the amount provided in the liquidated damages clause, although
a discrepancy does exist in some absolute sense. Often the problem will be de minimis.
To the extent that there is a serious discrepancy, this must be accepted as an imperfection
of contract damages in general. When the difficulty of proof of damages is transferred
from plaintiff to defendant through a liquidated damages clause, the parties have merely
allocated a risk which should be allocated. That is, the parties should be permitted to
allocate the risk of non-persuassion. See text accompanying note 72 infra.
However, where it appears that this risk was not freely bargained, as where one
party lacked essential information or the bargaining was grossly unequal, the court would
still be free to invalidate a liquidated damages clause on the grounds of adhesion or
uncoscionability. Cf. Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 84,
144 (1972).
46 Professor Sweet in his study, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CAn. L. Rsv.
84, 142-45 (1972), makes a similar suggestion, although he would leave in place most of
the common law tests of "reasonableness" and shift the burden on those issues to the
defendant. The solution here differs somewhat in that it would eliminate any resort to the
"reasonableness" test and focus solely on proof that the liquidated damages clause provides
a recovery in excess of actual loss. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
1
7 See note 71 infra.
3
'In a jury trial, the jury would be instructed that they are to find for the plaintiff
in the amount liquidated, unless the defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the damages are less. If the defendant meets this burden, the jury would find
for the plaintiff in the amount of his actual damage. It would, of course, be open to the
19751 197
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compensation that results when liquidated damages are shown to exceed
actual loss is prevented. 9
Such an approach presents two problems, however. First, courts
have generally not described liquidated damages as prima facie evidence.
Second, courts have not allocated the burden of proof in the manner
suggested by the proposed rule. Each of these points will be addressed
to ascertain whether they are impediments to the treatment of liquidated
damages as rebuttable prima facie evidence.
"Reasonableness"
Rather than treating liquidated damages as rebuttable prima facie
evidence, courts employ a complex maze of doctrine. Within this frame-
work, courts have generally considered the decisive test of a liquidated
damages clause to be the "reasonableness" of the recovery that it pro-
vides.4  To determine whether the amount of the recovery is reasonable,
the courts will often consider evidence that the parties expected proof of
actual loss to be difficult,41 that the amount stipulated approximated the
probable loss, 42 or that the parties "intended" to estimate the damage.43
Ironically, proof of actual loss has often been said to be irrelevant,44 or
relevant only to determining the "reasonableness" of the prediction made
by the parties.45
judge to direct a verdict or enter summary judgment if the defendant fails to meet his burden
of production. Cf. F. JAMES, CIVIt PROCEDURE §§ 7.5-7.7 (1965).
39 The proposed rule is offered only for cases where the bargaining has been fair. In
the ordinary commercial contract case, the correct result is more likely if it is presumed that
the parties have bargained to a proper allocation of resources. Where there is evidence
of adhesion, however, the "bargain" is much less likely to reflect the market solution. Where
adhesion is shown, the liquidated damages clause should not be given presumptive force.
See note 26 supra. See also Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 84,
144 (1972).
However, it is possible that in some cases enforcement would be unjust, although
"unconscionability" could not be shown. This likelihood is reduced by permitting the de-
fendant to prove the result would be unjust-i.e., to prove that the actual loss is less.
Many questions of adhesion are then resolved by preventing the result which adhesion doc-
trine aims to avoid. Cf. Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and the Judicial Pro-
cess, 49 IND. L.J. 367, 392 (1974). Professor Schwartz points out that unequal bargaining
power should be a relevant consideration only when the result violates public policy.
Otherwise, there is no reason for striking down agreements. Perhaps this result-oriented
approach would serve to lighten the load which the unconscionability doctrine presently
must bear. Cf. also R. POSNER, ECONOMfIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 53-55 (1973).
40 See cases cited note 19 supra; see also UNIFORMs COMMERCIAL CODE and the RESTATE-
MENT O F CON.ACTS, note 18 supra.
41 See note 47 infra & text accompanying.
42 See note 52 infra & text accompanying.
43 See note 57 infra & text accompanying.
44 See cases cited note 19 supra.
45 See, e.g., Frick Co. v. Rubel Corp., 62 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.);
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718(1), supra note 18.
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Despite an apparent disdain for evidence relating to actual loss,
these tests do not exclude such evidence. In fact, in utilizing these tests,
the courts are often able to determine whether the actual loss could
be proven. A decision that a liquidated damages clause is "reasonable"
is often a finding that the defendant could never show that the liquidated
damages exceed actual damage. Often, when it is clear that the amount
liquidated exceeds actual loss, the courts will find that the agreement
of the parties was somehow "unreasonable," and refuse enforcement.
46
1. Difficulty of Proof of Actual Loss
In many cases, the courts have pointed to the difficulties of proof
which the parties had anticipated at the time of contract as grounds for
enforcement. In In re Lion Overall Co.,47 the defendant failed to make
timely delivery of 25,000 military uniforms to the government in 1940.
As the court recognized:
The contract was made for an article of military equipment for our
troops at a time when the war clouds from Europe were gathering
ominously about this country and when it could reasonably be an-
ticipated, certainly by the Army and Navy Departments, that sooner
or later we might be embroiled in the conflict. While there were others
in the country who were manufacturing similar garments, what dam-
age might result from a delayed delivery could not be ascertained with
accuracy. 4
46 See text accompanying note 51 infra.
In asking, for example, whether the amount provided in the liquidated damages clause
was reasonably within the parties' contemplation of damages, the court will naturally look
to the situation at the time of trial, despite protestation that it is the moment of contract
that is decisive. Cf. 5 A. CoRan-T, CoRBiNr om CONTRACTS § 1063 (1964).
This much has expressly been admitted in some cases, where evidence of actual loss
was thought to bear on the "reasonableness" of the prediction made by the parties. See
Frick Co. v. Rubel Corp., 62 F.2d 765 (2nd Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.). This position
provides an intermediate ground for examining actual loss.
On the other hand, many courts, discarding the fiction that actual losses are irrelevant or
only partially relevant, have proceeded to strike down liquidated damages clauses simply
because the amount provided was wholly disproportionate to any actual losses sustained.
See, e.g., Broderick Wood Prods. Co. v. United States, 195 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952);
Tennent v. Leary, 82 Ariz. 67, 308 P.2d 693 (1957); Quaile & Co. v. William Kelly
Milling Co., 184 Ark. 717, 43 S.W.2d 369 (1931); Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393 (Fla.
1954); Nichols v. Knowles, 87 Idaho 550, 394 P.2d 630 (1964); Burnett v. Nolen, 336 I1.
App. 376, 84 N.E.2d 155 (1949); Beiser v. Kerr, 107 Ind. App. 1, 20 N.E.2d 666 (1939);
McMurray v. Faust, 224 Iowa 50, 276 N.W. 95 (1937); Davidow v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co.,
211 Mich. 90, 178 N.W. 776 (1920); Blunt v. Egeland, 104 Minn. 351, 116 N.W. 653
(1908); Plymouth Sec. Co. v. Johnson, 335 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. 1960); Seidlitz v. Auerbach,
230 N.Y. 167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920)
47 55 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Walkof, 144 F.2d
75 (2d Cir. 1944).
48 Id at 791.
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Thus, the court enforced the liquidated damages clause since it was
"reasonable" given the difficulties of proof anticipated at the time of
contract.
Clearly, however, the damages sustained in this case had not
become more easily ascertainable by the time of the trial. Indeed, given
the complex circumstances of the damage issue, the defendant would
never have been able to prove that the actual damages were less. There-
fore, despite the court's use of a "reasonableness" test, the result in this
case is perfectly consistent with treating liquidated damages as prima
facie evidence-where there is insufficient evidence to prove actual loss,
the amount liquidated should be awarded.49
Cases in which it can be shown that the actual loss is less than the
amount specified in the liquidated damages clause present a different
issue. In The Colombia,50 liquidated damages for delay were included
in a ship repair contract. Although the defendant completed the repairs
a month after the date promised in the contract, he was able to show
that no charter had become available to the ship's owner during this
49 It may well be that cases such as Lion Overall, which involve suits by the govern-
ment, should be discounted entirely on the ground that the government may enforce a
penalty. See, e.g., Weathers Bros. Transfer Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 310 (1947)
(liquidated damages clause for delay in transporting army officers' effects enforceable despite
absence of pecuniary loss to the government). However, opinions replete with expansive
language to the effect that actual loss is irrelevant appear in many cases between private
parties. For instance, in Mead v. Anton, 33 Wash. 2d 741, 207 P.2d 227 (1949), the court
refused to consider evidence that the actual loss was less than the amount provided in a
liquidated damages clause on the assumption that such evidence is generally irrelevant. In
that case, however, the issue was the amount of damages resulting from breach of a covenant
against competition. Any evidence of actual loss would surely have been speculative in such
a situation. See Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CAXis. L. Rev. 84, 124-25
(1972). The defendant in Mead could hardly have hoped to demonstrate a discrepancy
between actual loss and the recovery provided in the liquidated damages clause. Thus,
the decision in Mead cannot stand for the broad proposition that actual loss is always
irrelevant. The issue has been overstated in other cases of this sort. Cf., e.g., United States
v. Bethlehem Steel, 205 U.S. 105 (1907) (contract to deliver guns to the military providing
per diem damages for delay); United States v. LeRoy Dyal Co., 186 F.2d 460 (3d Cir.
1950) (breach of an agreement to buy only the potatoes of approved growers, as part of a
government price support system); Stephens v. Essex City Park Comm., 143 F. 844 (3d
Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 201 U.S. 648 (1906) (damages for delay in completion of park
facilities); Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., 89 Conn. 51, 92 A. 665 (1914) (delay in repair
of a yacht).
In a few cases, however, dictum from United States v. Bethlehem Steel, supra, to the
effect that no actual loss is necessary for enforcement of a liquidated damages clause, has
developed into a holding. Cf. Ellicott Machine Co. v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 232 (1908)
(government admitted it suffered no damage, yet was allowed to recover $25 per day for
delay in delivery of a ship); Byron Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal.
1940) (sesable); Southwest Engineering Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965)
(semnble). These cases represent the enforcement of penalties as generally understood.
See 5 A. ConarN, CoaniN oN CoNTRAcTs § 1062 n.45 (1964).
50 197 F. 661 (S.D. Ala. 1912), aff'd sub nom. Rasmussen v. Home Indust. Iron Works,
199 F. 990 (5th Cir. 1912).
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period and that, even had repairs been completed on schedule, the ship
would have remained idle. While the prediction of damages was almost
certainly "reasonable," this was an insufficient ground for enforcement
in light of the evidence that there were no actual damages." Clearly,
this result is consistent with the proposed rule. The defendant could
rebut the prima facie effect of the liquidated damages clause by intro-
ducing evidence that the actual loss was less.
2. Probable Loss
Some courts have examined the "reasonableness" of liquidated dam-
ages in terms of the anticipated or "probable" loss caused by the breach."
In Konner Rental Corp. v. Pedone,53 the defendant breached his promise
to lease two of the plaintiff's trucks. Defendant, however, was able to
show that the plaintiff could have relet the trucks, thereby avoiding some
damages. The court found the liquidated damages clause to be unreason-
able because it was not an accurate forecast of the "probable" loss. 4
This case demonstrates a phenomenon recognized by Professor
Corbin: that courts faced with a liquidated damages clause tend to
structure their analysis around what could have been foreseen at the
time of contract. However, if the question is what losses should rea-
5 In a case such as this, the "reasonableness" of the parties' prediction of damages
may be evident, yet the courts will refuse to enforce the liquidated damages clause. Cf.
Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co., 153 Conn. 681 689, 220 A.2d
263, 268 (1966):
It is not the function of the court to determine by hindsight the reasonableness of
the expectation of the parties at the time the contract was made, but it is the func-
tion of the court at the time of enforcement to do justice.
Many cases have refused to award the liquidated amount where there was no evidence that
plaintiff had been damaged by breach. E.g., Rispin v. Midnight Oil Co., 291 F. 481 (9th
Cir. 1923); Miller v. Macfarlane, 97 Conn. 299, 116 A. 335 (1922); Gorco Constr. Co.
v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 99 N.W.2d 69 (1959); Hathaway v. Lynn, 75 Wis. 186, 43 N.W.
956 (1889). Cf. REsTATEmENT op CONTRACTS § 339, comment e (1932):
e. If the parties honestly but mistakenly suppose that a breach will cause harm
that will be incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation, when in fact the
breach causes no harm at all or none that is incapable of accurate estimation without
difficulty, their advance agreement fixing the amount to be paid as damages for the
breach is within the rule stated in Subsection (1) and is not enforceable. Evidence
to prove such a mistake is admissible. But if the breach has caused injury of such
a character that it is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation, an advance
agreement making a reasonable forecast of its amount is enforced; and evidence,
the purpose of which is to substitute an estimate by the court or jury for that made
by the parties, is irrelevant52 See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); Walker v. Nunnen-
kamp, 84 Idaho 485, 373 P.2d 559 (1962); Condon v. Kemper, 47 Kan. 126, 27 P. 829
(1891); Helle v. Dempsey, 366 Mfich. 22, 113 N.W.2d 898 (1962); Dairy Co-op Assn. v.
Brandes Creamery, 147 Ore. 488, 30 P.2d 338 (1934); Mead v. Anton, 33 Wash. 2d 741,
207 P.2d 227 (1949).
.53 5 Misc. 2d 69, 269 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
54d at 71, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
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sonably have been anticipated, it is only natural that a court's determi-
nation on that issue would be affected by the facts which are available
at trial.55
Thus stripped of its facade of "reasonableness" dogma, the court's
inquiry into the accuracy of the estimate of probable loss greatly resem-
bles the inquiry under the proposed "prima facie" rule: whether the
defendant could show that the liquidated damages exceed the actual loss.
In fact, since the defendant would have been able to make such a show-
ing, the results under either approach are consistent.5 6
3. The "Intention" of the Parties
Many decisions," particularly those of the United States Supreme
Court,5 8 place an emphasis on whether the parties "intended" to make
a genuine pre-estimate of damages. It is evident, however, that the
courts will not enforce a liquidated damages clause that is otherwise
unreasonable simply because the parties intended it to be "reasonable." '59
Moreover, the only evidence of intention which is available in most cases
is the contract itself, since the parties do not ordinarily record bargain-
ing concerning liquidated damages.6" The court must therefore fall back
to a consideration of all the circumstances of the contract, with the in-
tention of the parties becoming a conclusion around which the court
may write its opinion.
For instance, in Kothe v. Taylor Trust,6' the Supreme Court con-
sidered the validity of a liquidated damages clause in a leasing agree-
ment. The agreement provided that, upon breach by the lessee, the
lessor could re-enter the property and recover as damages the full amount
of the rent for the remaining term of the lease. The Court found this
amount of damages disproportionate to the "anticipated" loss.62 The
Court concluded that this "circumstance tends to negative any notion
55 Cf. 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1059 (1964). See also note 46 supra.
56 By directly addressing the question of actual loss, on the other hand, such mental
gymnastics can he avoided, and the courts will be able to reach the correct result without
the manipulation of doctrine. See text accompanying note 67 infra. Cf. Sweet, Liquidated
Damages in California, 60 CALuF. L. REv. 84, 131-36 (1972); Note, Liquidated-Damages
Clauses in Real Estate Contracts, 4 U. FLA. L. Rav. 229, 234-35 (1951).57 See, e.g., Wright v. Rodgers, 198 Cal. 137, 243 P. 866 (1926); Giesecke v. Cullerton,
280 Ill. 510, 117 N.E. 777 (1917); Beiser v. Kerr, 107 Ind. App. 1, 20 N.E.2d 666 (1939);
Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920); Alvord v. Banfield, 85 Ore. 49,
166 P. 549 (1917); Smith v. Lambert Transfer Co., 109 Wash. 529, 187 P. 362 (1920).
58 See, e.g., Kothe v. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224 (1930); Wise v. United States, 249
U.S. 361 (1919).
" See 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1058 (1964).
60 Id.
61 280 U.S. 224 (1930).
62 Id. at 226.
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that the parties really meant to provide a measure of compensation... ,,6
and refused to enforce the liquidated damages clause.
While analysis in terms of "intention" appears to give freer rein
to contracting parties, the courts, as in this case, do consider evidence
of actual loss which ultimately controls. Such an approach is consistent
with the proposed rule which would dispense with intention altogether.
While the tests discussed above may seem, in form, antithetical to
treating liquidated damages as prima facie evidence of loss, rebuttable
by evidence that actual loss is less, their usage and effect are consistent
with such a rule." In practice, these tests permit courts to examine evi-
dence bearing upon actual loss which will often be conclusive, despite
the common assertion that actual loss is irrelevant. 5
Since the courts have considered actual loss in the past, the adop-
tion of a "prima facie evidence" rule would not alter the result of many
cases. As one court has recognized, when the law enforces a liquidated
damages clause,
[it] ... does not lose si&ht of the principle of compensation, which
is the law of the contract, but merely adopts the computation or
estimate of the damages made by the parties, as being the best and
most certain mode of ascertaining the actual damage.6
When evidence of actual loss can be produced, the value of the liquidated
damages clause as the best evidence of damages is lost. If the court is
not to lose sight of the principle of compensation, liquidated damages
should be rebuttable by evidence of actual loss.
63Id.
"4Cf. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CoRNELL L.Q. 495, 508
(1962).6
- Similarly, many cases have drawn a distinction between uncertainty of the damages
at time of contract, and uncertainty of the damages at time of trial, and have ruled that
the former is the only relevant uncertainty for purposes of determining the enforceability
of a liquidated damages clause. This distinction, which again implies that proof of actual
loss is irrelevant if the prediction of the parties was reasonable, is questionable. In the cases
which establish this distinction, the damages were at least as uncertain after breach as they
were before. There was no need to reach the metaphysical distinction between anticipated
and actual uncertainty of loss, since actual uncertainty was evident at time of trial. See, e.g.,
Gustav Hirsch Org. v. Eastern Ky. Rural Elec. Co-op Corp., 201 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Ky.
1962) (delay in constructing lines for transportation of high voltage electric current); Asso-
ciated Press v. Emmett, 45 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (breach of membership agree-
ment by member of news-gathering association); Robbins v. Plant, 174 Ark. 639, 297 S.W.
1027 (1927) (breach of covenant against competition); Downtown Harvard Lunch Club v.
Racso, 201 Misc. 1087, 107 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1951) (breach of lessor's promise to provide food
and drink, with resulting loss of dues, inconvenience to club members, etc.); Callanan Road
Imp. Co. v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 190 Misc. 418, 72 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1947)
(breach of sales agreement; buyer unable to cover in the market given monopoly conditions
at time of breach).
6J6aquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123, 137-38 (1858). Cf. Cox v. Smith, 93 Ark. 371,
125 S.W. 437 (1910); Vrooman v. Milgram, 124 Pa. Super. 145, 188 A. 538 (1936).
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Rather than addressing actual loss through a complex overlay of
doctrine, courts could reach the same question directly by asking whether
evidence of actual loss rebuts the liquidated damages clause. Conceptual
ambiguities and anomalies in the present law would be resolved.67 By
abandoning speculation as to the "uncertainty" of the damages,68 their
relation to probable or actual loss,69 or the "intention" of the parties,7"
and by requiring proof that actual loss is less, courts could resolve the
issue cleanly.
Finally, a rule treating liquidated damages as prima facie evidence
would be easily applied and would produce predictable results, thus re-
ducing the risk of error."' Since the parties would be able to predict
the outcome of litigation more easily, settlements would be encouraged,
reducing litigation and fostering judicial economy.
Burden of Proof
The other objection to the proposed rule is that courts have not
placed the burden of proving actual loss on the defendant as would the
proposed rule. Instead, after finding that a liquidated damages clause
is unenforceable, the courts have proceeded to place the burden of proof
67 See, 5 A. CoRBxN, CoaruN ON CoNTRACTs § 1059 (1964); Macneil, Power of Contract
and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORxELL L.Q. 495, 502 (1962).
The courts themselves have often noted that the tests they employ in this area are per-
plexing. See, e.g., Dowd v. Andrews, 77 Ind. App. 627, 134 N.E. 294 (1922); Wilson v.
Baltimore, 83 Md. 203, 34 A. 774 (1896); Yerxa v. Randazzo Macaroni Mfg. Co., 315 Mo.
927, 288 S.W. 20 (1926); Retailer's Serv. Bureau v. Smith, 165 S.C. 238, 163 S.E. 649
(1932); Zucht v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 207 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Wilbur
v. Taylor, 154 Wash. 282, 282 P.65 (1929).
68 Cf. cases cited note 65 supra.
The related "difficulty of proof" requirement should also be abandoned. Cf. text ac-
companying note 47 supra. Professor Macneil observes that there are at least five mean-
ings that could be attributed to the "difficulty of proof" test. Macneil, Power of Contract
and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 502 (1962).
69 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
70 See cases cited note 57 supra.
"' Recently the suggestion has been made that tort law would benefit from the employ-
ment of a similar device. This would be a
resort to a traditional technique of the law-the development of an elaborate net-
work of substantive presumptions which will allow us to reach sound systematic
results by an indefinite series of approximations, each of which will move us closer
to a fuller statement of the substantive law. These presumptions do not necessarily
decide a case in a given manner, hut each indicates that the result must go one
way on the strength of the facts alleged, unless the other party is able to give
some 'good reason' why it should not. Epstein, Defences and Subsequent Pleas in a
System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 165, 166 (1974).
In a similar fashion, contract law may be able to transform factual questions into ques-
tions of law, and thus reach more systematic and coherent results. Cf. G. Gi~moRE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRAcT 42 (1974). By resolving liquidated damage questions through a re-
buttable presumption, it will be possible to ensure an approximation of the proper result.
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of actual loss upon the plaintiff. 2 Such an approach unnecessarily re-
duces the effectiveness of a liquidated damages clause. If it is possible
to prove the extent of the damages, either party to the contract should
generally be able to do so. Where it may not be possible to prove actual
loss, the parties should be permitted to allocate the risk of non-persuasion.
In casting upon the defendant the burden of proving that the actual
loss is less than the amount liquidated, the proposed rule is consistent
with the general principle that the burden of proving contract defenses
rests with the defendant. Proving the defenses of impossibility,"' mis-
take,74 fraud,"5 duress,7 and illegality,7 is a burden placed on the de-
fendant. The law has generally presumed that bargains are enforceable
and therefore required the party who asks the court to intervene against
an otherwise enforceable bargain to demonstrate the need to do so.76
Under the rule proposed, the defendant is called upon to show that the
recovery provided in a liquidated damages clause is inconsistent with
the allocation made by the competitive market. That is the same burden
72 See, e.g., Mellor v. Budget Advisors, Inc., 415 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1969); Cortner v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 225 Ala. 575, 144 So. 443 (1932); Spivack v. Connecticut Smiles,
Inc., 128 "Conn. 146, 20 A.2d 731 (1941); Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 272 P.2d 1020
(1954); Arco Bag Co. v. Facings, Inc., 18 Ill. App. 2d 110, 151 N.E.2d 438 (1958); Jeffries
v. Lesh, 195 Ind. 503, 144 N.E. 881 (1924); Noble v. Sturm, 210 Mich. 462, 178 N.W. 99
(1920); Schleifer v. Henry George & Rosenbaum Co., 102 Misc. 508, 169 N.Y.S. 132 (Sup.
Ct. 1918); Jolley v. Georgeff, 92 Ohio App. 271, 110 N.E.2d 23 (1952).
3 See, e.g., Ocean Air Tradeways, Inc. v. Arkay Realty Corp., 480 F.2d 1112 (9th Cir.
1973); Hensler v. City of Los Angeles, 124 Cal. App. 2d 71, 268 P.2d 12 (1954); Great
Am. Ins. Co. v. City of Boulder, 476 P.2d 586 (Colo. App. 1970); Paddock v. Mason, 187
Va. 809, 48 S.E.2d 199 (1948).
7 4 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Crawford, 370 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1967); Lawless
v. Ennis, 3 Ariz. App. 451, 415 P.2d 465 (1966); Rodgers v. Lyon, 507 S.W.2d 95 (Ark.
1974); Bennett v. Madison Sales Co., 264 Ky. 728, 95 S.W.2d 604 (1936); Pike Rapids
Power Co. v. Schwintek, 176 Minn. 324, 223 N.W. 612 (1929); Gibbons v. Perkins, 132
Misc. 583, 230 N.Y.S. 273 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Miller v. Miller, 120 Ore. 484, 252 P. 705 (1927).
7
' See, e.g., Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
948 (1968); Lawless v. Ennis, 3 Ariz. App. 451, 415 P.2d 465 (1966); Lyon v. Lyon, 70
Cal. App. 607, 233 P. 988 (1925); Samuels v. Worst, 318 Ill. 297, 149 N.E. 228 (1925);
Lincoln-Income Life Ins. Co. v. Kraus, 279 Ky. 842, 132 S.W.2d 318 (1939); Capen v.
Capen, 234 Mass. 355, 125 N.E. 692 (1920); Mann v. Osborne, 153 Va. 190, 149 S.E. 537
(1929).7 6 See, e.g., Stoltze v. Stoltze, 393 Ill. 433, 66 N.E.2d 424 (1946); Willett v. Herrick,
258 Mass. 585, 155 N.E. 589 (1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 545 (1927); Weiner v. Tele King
Corp., 123 N.Y.S.2d 101 (Sup. Ct. 1953).7 7 See, e.g., Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951); Eaton v. Brock, 124
Cal. App. 2d 10, 268 P.2d 58 (1954); Gower v. Ozmer, 55 Ga. App. 81, 189 S.E. 540 (1936);
Meyer v. Buckman, 7 Ill. App. 2d 385, 129 N.E.2d 603 (1955); Chamberlain v. Employers'
Liab. Assurance Corp., 289 Mass. 412, 194 N.E. 310 (1935); Maxwell v. Schaefer, 381 Pa.
13, 112 A.2d 69 (1955); Wilder v. Nolte, 195 Wash. 1, 79 P.2d 682 (1938).
7"Beyond bearing the burden of proof, the defendant should perhaps also be required
to bear the costs of litigating a liquidated damages clause. These costs should be made part
of the calculus of a party contemplating breach, since they are social costs which breach
will entail. See Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Ef-
crncy, 24 RuTGERs L. R.v. 273, 285 (1970).
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faced by a defendant who alleges frustration of purpose or impossibil-
ity, affirmative defenses ensuring that the obligations of contracting
parties will be adjusted to reflect altered market situations."9 Thus, the
proposed rule would also be consistent with the general body of con-
tract law.
CONCLUSION
Liquidated damages should be treated as prima facie evidence of
loss, rebuttable by evidence that actual loss is less. This rule directly
confronts the most relevant issue: would award of the amount provided
in the liquidated damages clause compensate the innocent party consis-
tently with the requirements of a competitive market? Where the liqui-
dated amount approximates actual loss, the defendant will be unable to
rebut the presumption in favor of the liquidated damages clause and the
amount liquidated will fairly compensate the plaintiff. Where the amount
79 Cf. Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry of
Contract Law, 1969 DuxE L.J. 49; Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal Cases:
Excuse for Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic Theory,
20 HASTINGS L.J. 1393 (1969).
Professor Birmingham demonstrates that:
[M]odern courts have been increasingly unwilling to maintain the fiction of class-
ical theory that contracting individuals have negotiated an optimal equilibrium
which it would be presumptuous to disturb.
1969 DuKE L.J. 49 at 53.
Rather, the courts will intervene when some public policy is disturbed. Furthermore,
as Birmingham shows, such intervention is necessary where the perceived market positions
of the parties change, rendering enforcement inequitable.
Moreover, the pervasive contracts doctrine of the "duty" to mitigate or to avoid loss
caused by breach is calculated to impose upon the defendant only the costs of breach as
dictated by the market. Whatever damages may have been foreseen or appear to have
occurred, it is always open to defendant to show that plaintiff failed to take advantage of
market substitutes for performance. Where this can be shown, it is evident that the dam-
age remedy plaintiff asks is to some extent unnecessary since the market itself has pro-
vided his remedy. Accordingly, plaintiff's recovery is reduced by the amount of the dam-
ages that were avoidable. See 5 A. CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRaACTS § 1039 (1964).
Treating liquidated damages as prima facie evidence of loss also would permit the
court to find the market solution. The defendant in an action to enforce a liquidated dam-
ages clause should be required to carry the burden of proving that actual loss is less, just
as the defendant to a damage action must show plaintiff's failure to avoid some part of
the damages. See, e.g., Barnebey v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 65 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1933);
Mass v. Board of Educ., 61 Cal. 2d 612, 394 P.2d 579, 39 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1964); Franco v.
Fujimoto, 47 Hawaii 408, 390 P.2d 740 (1964); New York, C. & St. L.R.R. v. American
Transit Lines, 408 fI1. 336, 97 N.E.2d 264 (1951); Miller v. Long, 126 Ind. App. 482, 131
N.E.2d 348 (1956); Anderson v. Rexroad, 180 Kan. 505, 306 P.2d 137 (1957); Food Spe-
dalties, Inc. v. John C. Dowd, Inc., 339 Mass. 735, 162 N.E.2d 276 (1959); Milligan v.
Haggerty, 296 Mich. 62, 295 N.W. 560 (1941); Losei Realty Corp. v. City of New York,
254 N.Y. 41, 171 N.E. 899 (1930); Spiese v. Mutual Trust Co., 258 Pa. 414, 102 A. 119
(1917); Foreman v. E. Caligari & Co., 204 Va. 284, 130 S.E.2d 447 (1963); Burr v. Clark,
30 Wash. 2d 149, 190 P.2d 769 (1948).
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provided in the liquidated damages clause exceeds actual loss," the de-
fendant will be able to prove this and the plaintiff will then be awarded
only his actual damages, thus achieving the goal of compensation and
thereby maintaining market mobility. Where the actual damages are
impossible or very difficult to prove, the parties' allocation of the risk
of non-persuasion will be enforced.
JAmES PATRICK FENTON
8oWhere plaintiff's actual loss exceeds the amount liquidated, somewhat different con-
cerns are involved. In order to protect contracting parties from inordinate risks, the courts
will generally enforce fairly bargained limitations on liability. Cf. Fritz, "Underliquidated'
Damages as Limitation of Liability, 33 TE. L. Rxv. 196 (1954). Judicial sympathy toward
such limitations is probably in large part a product of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156
Eng. Rep. 145 (ex. 1854), which, by one interpretation, means that a party must affirma-
tively accept liability for consequential or special damages. This, in turn, has come to mean
that contract damages may be limited by the contract. Cf. Globe Refining Co. v. Landa
Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543-44 (1903) (Holmes, J.).

